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This author analyses the 2013 Lithua-
nian presidency of the EU in the context of 
the Ukrainian crisis and evaluates the con-
tribution of Latvia and Estonia (the former 
Soviet republics set to preside over the EU 
in 2015 and 2018) to the shift in the power 
balance in the post-Soviet space. Through 
assessing the actions of small countries in 
promoting the Eastern Partnership pro-
gramme with an emphasis on the anti-Rus-
sian agenda, the author concludes that they 
will inflict harm on the EU in a long-term 
perspective. These former Soviet republics 
no longer rely on mere diplomacy, but re-
sort to a whole new problematic narrative, 
where Russia is described as an “aggres-
sive and unpredictable neighbour” that 
poses the “threat from the East.” Being 
more mobile, small countries are able to 
concentrate power and resources in one or 
several key areas. This makes it possible 
for these countries to take advantage of in-
ternational politics (even if the conse-
quences of such steps are miscalculated) 
and “feed” on it through — sometimes 
consciously — creating “conflict nodes” in 
the relations between major players. This is 
especially true in the case of states that do 
not bear responsibility for global stability. 
 
Key words: Baltics, Eastern Partner-
ship, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, 
small states. 
 
 
The crisis in Ukraine has ques-
tioned the efficiency of the existing 
system of checks and balances in inter-
national relations. Unlike major geopo-
litical actors playing in the Ukrainian 
field, the actions of small nations in the 
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current situation in Ukraine usually remain unnoticed by researchers. This 
holds true for the three Baltic states, after the EU presidency of one of 
which — Lithuania — the Ukrainian situation entered its acute phase. Lithu-
ania was the first former Soviet Republic to preside over the EU. Can the 
situation in Ukraine developing during the Lithuanian precedence be inter-
preted as a precedent? Answering this question requires analysing the pro-
spects of the other “post-Soviet” presidencies: Latvia will head the EU at the 
beginning of 2015 and Estonia in 2018. 
The Ukrainian “fire,” which followed the Lithuanian presidency, calls 
for meticulous attention to the role that the Baltics strive to play in the post-
Soviet space — a territory that remains unsteady a quarter century after the 
collapse of the USSR. 
The status of a “small power” (as interpreted by R. Rothstein)1 deter-
mines the capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Russian politi-
cal scientist M. Ilyin — the author of a state typology based on J. Colomer’s 
ideas [5] — defined small powers as follows: they have a small territory and 
population, a pronounced dependency complex (however, in some cases they 
can strive for a relatively independent foreign and domestic policy), whereas 
their priority function is “adjusting” international relations [16]. However, 
the currently increasing interdependence makes it possible to speak not only 
of “adjustment” but also of a significant impact on the decisions and actions 
of larger states. However, Ilyin argues small powers are incapable of taking 
an independent position: situated along the axes of mega- and macro-state, 
small powers can move away from these axes and create more or less wide 
belts, arcs, and nodes [15]. 
The leading states have a wide range of tools to achieve their foreign 
policy objectives based on military, socio-political, economic, and ideologi-
cal resources. M. Lebedeva stresses that great powers, nevertheless, cannot 
use the whole range of resources at a time (at least, due to their high cost). 
                                                     
1 R. Rothstein defined a small power as a state that “recognizes that it cannot obtain 
security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally 
on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small 
Power’s belief in its inability to do so must also be recognized by the other states 
involved in international politics” [12]. It can be juxtaposed with Lithuania’s posi-
tion on the eve of accession to the EU: “Lithuania as a small country with limited 
economic and demographic resources is not able to implement its foreign and secu-
rity policy globally alone.” For more detail, see [8]. L. Linkevičius was Minister of 
National Defence at the time and Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lithuania’s 
presidency in 2013. 
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Further, she identifies a drift towards socio-political and humanitarian re-
sources, which are less costly and can be disseminated using modern tech-
nologies. Also, she emphasises the ongoing process of the fragmentation of 
resource potential. Therefore, if the whole range of resources is unavailable 
to a certain “player,” they focus on one of them [18]. 
The range of small states’ functional capabilities is limited to acting as a 
buffer zone, diplomatic mediator, barrier state, geopolitical gateway, or pe-
riphery [7]. Due to the peripheral and transit position of the country, the set 
of functions will be determined by the actions of leading states. This idea 
corresponds to the thesis advanced by A. Bogaturov that the Baltics did not 
become major players in global politics but rather strived to accumulate their 
political, ideological, and financial-economic capital through playing on the 
relations between Russian and the West, and Russia and the USA, actually, 
“feeding” on them [14] by taking advantage of “conflict nodes.” 
In the conditions of absent or limited resources for promoting their 
interests in the international arena, small states concentrate on diplomacy. 
The most efficient tool is to form coalitions based both on the territorial 
principle (for instance, the Nordic and Baltic minister (NB6) work-
ing breakfast before each meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council) and 
the problem-based one [13] (it is small powers that insist on keeping the 
Eastern Partnership2 at the top of the EU agenda, they also united against the 
appointment of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs F. Mogherini the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 
July 2014). 
Motieka and Statkus stress that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia adhere to a 
pro-US geopolitical agenda considering the US the major guarantor of the 
country’s sovereignty, since (1) the USA did not acknowledge the legitimacy 
of incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR, and (2) the 
country considers the US a counterbalance to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions 
in the Baltic region. For the US, the Baltics are a “wedge” between Europe 
                                                     
2 The Eastern Partnership was initiated by Poland and Sweden in 2009. Moscow was 
given the role of an observer that can make comments but cannot affect the process. 
The need to create the EP was explained by the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the gas 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The programme is aimed at further 
restructuring of the post-Soviet space, and accelerated political rapprochement and 
economic integration between the EU and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. The Russian leadership regards projects based on the “zero-
sum game” logic as unproductive one interpreting them as interference with 
integration processes with Russian participation. 
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and Russia, as well as “agents of influence” in the EU (alongside other coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe). Despite the possible cost of playing this 
role, Lithuania's elite consider the pro-American agenda a better scenario than 
its absence or replacement thereof with an exceptionally pro-European one [9]. 
The problem of “double allegiance” [4] (the need to act in line with the 
common European policy developed by the major European powers and to 
display loyalty to the Atlantic foreign policy vector3) shapes a specific style 
of behaviour in the political elite of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the in-
ternational arena, which can be described as regression from the status of a 
buffer area to the role of provocateurs in the post-Soviet space. This became 
especially evident in the course of the Ukrainian crisis, which followed the 
unsuccessful Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013. “The Vilnius 
summit became the trigger of a gun that fired a shot on the squares in 
Ukraine’s capital” [21]. 
The thesis of the EU's Eastern policy as “a geopolitical battle with Russia 
over the common neighbourhood” [11] had been adopted by Lithuania long 
before it assumed presidency over the EU. The Lithuanian political elite, that 
has undergone little change since the days of Sąjūdis, shows an alarmist atti-
tude towards Russia, which is based on equating the notion pro-European and 
anti-Russian. This is multiplied by that Lithuania sees itself as a “missionary” 
of transformations in the post-Soviet space. For example, one of the leaders of 
the major Lithuanian political party Lithuanian Christian Democrats, the long-
standing Prime Minister A. Kubilius presented in 2007 the Russia Contain-
ment Strategy (in 2014, he published an upgraded version). In particular, it re-
lies on the thesis that the increased presence of the US in Europe will drive 
Russia away and the belief that Lithuania in collaboration with its neighbours 
and the US should become an architect of a new neighbourhood policy. In 
2004, when Lithuania acceded to the European Union, an agreement endorsed 
by the major parliamentary parties was reached. It formulated the goals of 
Lithuania's foreign policy until 2008, including the launch of democratic pro-
cesses in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the South Caucasus, as well 
as the Kaliningrad region [2]. In a cross-party agreement for 2008—2012, 
Lithuania sets the target of becoming a hub for joint regional initiatives and a 
centre for promoting Euroatlantic values. The first priority on the list of key 
foreign policy objectives is facilitating the further enlargement of the EU and 
                                                     
3 A characteristic example of such policy is a meeting of Lithuanian, Latvian, and 
Estonian leaders with President Obama in August 2013 in Washington, which 
stressed the “geostrategic importanc” of Ukraine's Eurointegration and the success of 
the Vilnius summit. For more detail see [10].  
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NATO focusing on Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the countries of the South 
Caucasus. It also stresses the significance of the Eastern vector of the Europe-
an neighbourhood policy and makes it clear what neighbour poses a threat to 
security [3]. The most recent document of this kind is dated March 29, 2014. It 
raises the issue of Stalin's rule, condemns Russia for aggression against 
Ukraine, and attempts to revise the history of the 20th century and destroy the 
system of international relations, etc. Such “minor details” as democracy in the 
Kaliningrad region are not mentioned — this is a document of a different 
scale: Lithuania aims to bring the Eastern Partnership target countries close to 
the Euroatlantic community as soon as possible. Official Vilnius aims to 
achieve this target until 2020 [1]. 
Latvia and Estonia pursue a similar policy. However, they do not strive for 
a leading position in developing scenarios for the post-Soviet space. Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia constantly portray Russia as threat. The Baltics regret that 
the did not manage to open the eyes of Europe4 to “Russian aggression” 
against Georgia despite their overall support for Saakashvili's regime (several 
years later, he was accused of a series of criminal offences, repressions, and 
fraud; however the Baltic leadership turned a blind eye to these facts). The Es-
tonian political scientist A. Kasekamp believes that the Georgian conflict was 
a paradigm shift for Estonians. Nevertheless it did not have the same effect on 
the major European actors, which interpreted the attempts of Baltic politicians 
to strengthen support for Georgia as encouraging imprudence. However, he 
stresses that the work with the target Eastern Partnership states should be con-
tinued. To this end, the Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership has been oper-
ating in Tallinn since 2011 under the umbrella of the Estonian diplomatic 
school and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Centre focuses on training of-
ficials and diplomats from the EP countries [6]. 
According to experts, the annual losses of the Baltics, associated with the 
politicised relations with Russia, account for 9—10 % of the countries' GDP. 
Over the last four years, Estonia and Latvia have lost approximately 10,100 
m USD. In the case of Lithuania, which strives to set the tone for the Baltic 
foreign policy, losses amount to 15,000 m USD. Using the fear of Russia, 
the Baltics generate distrust not only of the countries neighbouring the EU 
but also of fellow EU members (despite that the Union is based on the prin-
ciples of trust, interconnection, and interdependence) [19]. 
                                                     
4 The Baltics took a more aggressive position during the Ukraine crisis driving the 
EU to the maximum deterioration of relations with Russia and NATO to an 
“adequate response.”  
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It is worth noting Lithuania's initiative for reforming the Eastern Partner-
ship programme which had been announced a year before the country assumed 
presidency over the EU. Riga does not seem to have realised that the Eastern 
Partnership is turning from a programme aimed at the stability and prosperity 
of target countries into a source of geopolitical turbulence and a direct threat to 
the stability of target countries' statehood. On the contrary, the country is fol-
lowing the example of the Lithuanian elite who contributed to the maximum 
deterioration of relations between their state and Russia in the course of their 
EU presidency. Riga suggested naming the US a key partner in the EU's East-
ern politics and turning the Eastern Partnership into the Euroatlantic Eastern 
Partnership offering the target countries the prospect of full membership in the 
EU [20]. The USA entering the Eastern Partnership as a key partner will sig-
nificantly increase the conflict potential of the programme driving the EU to 
the periphery of political activity in the post-Soviet space. 
A lack of deliberation and haste5 characteristic of the actions and state-
ments of Baltic politicians in the international arena (some of them are inten-
tionally arrogant, aimed to create “conflict nodes” rather than solve problems 
and use simplified ideological schemes) show that the perception of diplo-
macy as a resource can be rather distorted, which points to the mediocrity of 
the elites6 of these peripheral states. 
One can expect that the further “post-Soviet” EU presidencies will increase 
the level of toxicity of the Russia containment policy against the background of 
ongoing attempts to restructure the post-Soviet space using the Cold war tech-
niques. In the end, it will contradict the strategic interests of Europe. Such ac-
tions of small powers can create new risks to the European security system. It 
                                                     
5 One can recall the hasty support of the US military strike against Syria in 
September 2013. 
6 In this respect, M. Kaveshnikov is right to mention that “the system problem that 
small powers pose for the world order relates to the gap between the increased 
capabilities of small powers and a lack of strategic vision and responsibility, 
consumer attitudes, and a low quality of political elites characteristic of small 
states.” Defining provincialism as a “state of mind” of the ruling elites of a number 
of small power, he stresses that Polish and Baltic politicians – while understanding 
the limits to their influence in the EU – use a simple way to increase their 
significance. Presenting the EU-Russian relations as constant escalation of a conflict, 
they claim the status of the first “defence line” in the fight with the “evil from the 
East [17]. This observation is rather accurate; it is sufficient to acquaint oneself with 
the statements of key Baltic politicians made over the recent decades. There is no 
need to give any remarkable examples – all of them are rather similar and boil down 
to the idea that “the enemy is at the gate.”  
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becomes increasingly possible as the international system loses its stability. 
Small powers are mobile. They are capable of rapid concentration of forces and 
resources in one or several key areas. Therefore, they can take advantage of the 
international political situation using the “seesaw” of “double allegiance”. 
Moreover, they strive not only to “feed on” it but also to be pr0active (even if 
the consequences of such actions are not accurately calculated), thus sometimes 
creating “conflict nodes” in the relations of major players. It is especially true 
for states that do not bear responsibility for global stability. In their case, the line 
between a rapid response to changes in the global arena and an evident provoca-
tion becomes so thin that it can be easily disregarded. 
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ECONOMY AND TOURISM 
 
 
 
This article explores the current condition 
and spatial dynamics of the key socioeconomic 
processes in the coastal zone of the European 
subcontinent at the turn of the 20th century. 
Europe is a region where the “coastal compo-
nent” of socioeconomic development plays a 
major role and is therefore one of the most in-
teresting objects for research in this field. 
Russian geographical proximity to the 
European countries, a significant number of 
shared problems, and a considerable poten-
tial for cooperation in solving them and de-
veloping the world ocean’s resources create 
grounds for an integrated study of European 
coastal regions. The author analyses Rus-
sian findings in the field of the socioeco-
nomic development of coastal regions. 
The differences in the natural and so-
cioeconomic conditions and resources 
along a significant portion of the European 
coastline necessitate the zoning of subcon-
tinent’s coastal territories and contiguous 
water areas. The findings of EU maritime 
research constitute the economic and sta-
tistical basis of the study, whose author, 
relying on necessary calculations, proposes 
a new concept of coastal regions. 
The study identifies significant differ-
ences in the nature and trends in the devel-
opment of European coastal regions in the 
first decade of the 21st century. Thus, Rus-
sian coastal regions show the most dynamic 
development rate. In general, coastal re-
gions are not superior to inland European 
regions in terms of major development rates. 
 
Key words: coastal regions, Europe, 
EU, socioeconomic development, maritime 
industry, territorial structure of economy, 
gross regional product, population. 
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The significance of the coastal factor for social development is difficult 
to overestimate. The first studies of the issues within the marine sector 
emerged in the second half of the 20th century as the use of sea and ocean re-
sources was increasing in almost all coastal countries. The USA, France, the 
UK, Norway, the European Union, and international organisations (UN, 
OECD, etc.) have proved to be extremely active in this field [15]. 
A substantial research of this problem has been carried out by the Soviet 
and Russian authors. In 1979, Salnikov et al. authored a seminal tome called 
The Economic Geography of the World Ocean, which was published in a se-
ries of books on geography of the sea. It focused on a number of spatial as-
pects of ocean resource potential studied within the framework of contempo-
rary theoretical assumptions of economic geography. “The economic geog-
raphy of the ocean,” Pokshsishevsky and Salnikov wrote in the preface to the 
book, “is part of geography of world economy addressing the patterns of ge-
ographical division of social labour in the process of development and func-
tioning of spatial socioeconomic complexes of the World Ocean… Thus, 
economic geography of the ocean is an integral part and research area of ge-
ography per se, in particular, part of economic geography” [33]. 
The methodological framework of the new research area continued to 
develop. In the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet academic community began to 
summarise the first results of accelerated exploration of nearshore areas and 
shelves and development of the maritime industry. The most notable studies 
of this period include the works of Voitlovski, Dergachev, Zalogin, Lavrov, 
Nadtochy, Pokshishevsky, Slevich, and others [7; 10; 12; 16; 24; 25; 28]. In 
particular, V. Pokshishevsky uses the notion of a land-water production 
complex [25]. One of the key concepts — natural and economic system — 
was developed in the “maritime” context. Another important concept, that of 
land-ocean natural and economic contact zone was introduced by Dergachev 
[10; 17] and further developed by him in a general theoretical direction. The 
land-ocean natural and economic contact zone is defined as a historically de-
veloped system of interactions between population, economy, and nature. 
A significant number of works on the geoecology of nearshore areas has 
been published over the last three decades. One of the key operating terms 
introduced in that time is the geoecology of coastal sea zone [1]. N. Aibula-
tov and Yu. Artyukhin pay special attention to identifying the subject and 
objectives of the new scientific area [2]. Some of these works focus on re-
gional environmental/economic problems [3; 21]. 
An interesting interpretation of the international practices of managing 
coastal territories is presented in S. Fadeev’s work, where the coastal zone is 
defined as a special hierarchical economic and geographical object [32]. 
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Fadeev believes that the functioning of different types of coastal zones in 
Western Europe defines them as an established integrated system. A sys-
temic approach is developed in S. Sychev’s work, which examines a coastal 
zone as a composite complex bringing together geographical, environmental, 
economic, and social systems [31]. 
Relevant economic and geographical problems of the development of 
coastal regions are explored by L. Bezrukov [4, 5]. He emphasises the need 
to analyse the impact of such basic factor of planetary heterogeneity as the 
land/ocean division on the features and efficiency of national economies. An 
analysis of the 20th century changes in the population distribution in Russia 
shows a pronounced shift in the demographic and economic potential to-
wards the inland regions (continentalization). However, the global trend is 
quite different — population migrates towards the coasts of warm seas. Var-
ious strategic methods have been proposed to mitigate the negative con-
sequences of the process observed in Russia. 
The calculations (see Fig. 4) do not suggest that coastal regions are un-
conditionally attractive — in Europe, at least. In 2000—2011, the contribu-
tion of coastal regions to the GDP of corresponding territories did not show a 
significant increase. The specific weight of the regions’ population demon-
strated a slight growth of 0.9 per cent. The development of new high-speed 
transport links gave inland regions an additional advantage in competing 
with coastal ones. 
Several little-studied aspects of managing the economy of coastal re-
gions are addressed by I. Soloviova [29]. The competitiveness of a maritime 
sector in the conditions of globalisation requires efficient methods of organi-
sation, for instance, maritime corporations. The latter should have the tools 
to ensure the economic and military-political presence in certain Russian 
offshore areas. 
The pronounced Northern—Arctic vector of Russian maritime policy is 
discussed by L. Bocharova [6]. She identifies and provides some justifica-
tion for the strategic priorities of maritime sector development and Russian 
Arctic policy. 
Yu. Malinina estimates the total contribution of maritime activities to 
Russian economy at approximately 1 % of the GDP, which is much less than 
in the US and the EU [18]. The largest industries of Russian maritime sector 
are transportation (41 %) and fishery (27 %, as of 2006). 
A significant contribution to maritime sector studies has been made by 
G. Gogoberidze. His major work, Complex Zoning of the Costal Territories 
of the World Ocean [8], uses the concept of diversified complex multifactor 
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zoning based on the characteristics underlying the physical geographical, so-
cioeconomic, political and administrative, and military geographical factors. 
Based on an analysis of numerous sources and statistics, he attempts the zon-
ing of coastal areas. Gogoberidze identifies eight major georegions in Europe: 
Russian-Barents Sea, Norwegian-Icelandic, Anglo-European, German-Danish, 
Baltic, Iberian-island, European Mediterranean, and Black Sea-Caspian. Our 
work relies on a modification of the scheme developed by Gogoberidze (we, 
too, distinguish between eight goeregions, however, of a different format, see 
Fig. 1). Our focus will be on the problems of development of European coastal 
regions and the spatial aspects of the maritime policies of European countries. 
G. Gogoberidze defines the maritime complex as an aggregate of indus-
tries, enterprises, and organisations situated on the sea coast and immediately 
related to maritime activities, which contributes to the implementation of the 
national marine policy and sustainable economic development of coastal terri-
tories [9]. He also addresses the possibility of building a three-level structure 
of managing marine georegions (a state, a region, a municipality). 
Of significant interest is the monograph of V. Ivchenko on the network 
programming of the development of Russian coastal regions [13]. This work 
analyses the theory, methodology, and practice of economic network pro-
gramming. Ivchenko stresses that Russian coastal regions were rather success-
ful in overcoming crises and that their development was largely sporadic. 
State programmes for the development of coastal regions took into ac-
count the theoretical and practical groundwork. These programmes include 
the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until 2020 [23], the Decree 
of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 8, 2010 No. 2205 
On the Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities in the Russian 
Federation until 2030 [27], and the Decree of the Government of the Russian 
Federation of August 10, 1998 No. 919 On the Federal Target Programme 
“The World Ocean” [26]. They emphasise that Russia has historically been a 
leading maritime nation due to its spatial and geophysical features and its 
role in global and regional international relations. The priority areas of na-
tional marine policy are the Atlantic and Arctic regions. 
Overall, the studies of coastal regions use the following conceptual ap-
proaches to identifying and analysing territories: 
1) spatial (geospatial), geographical, chronological approaches [5; 8; 31]; 
2) genetic historical approach [2; 4]; 
3) geosystemic (including geoeconomic, geopolitical, geodemographic, 
military geodemographic, geoecological, resource-based, and physical geo-
graphical) approaches [3; 4; 8; 11; 22; 31; 35; 36, etc.]; 
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4) problem-based (including target programme) approach [4; 16; 18]. 
Russian state programmes for the development of coastal regions are of 
pronounced systemic nature. One can easily identify the solid base of the in-
tegrated systemic approach to studying coastal regions. We will also adopt 
this approach. 
Of special interest are studies into the regional features of maritime eco-
nomic activities of the neighbouring maritime nations and integration groups, 
in particular, the EU. Modern trends in population distribution and economic 
development stress the significance of water area resources and similarities in 
the problems of their development. It thus seems relevant to study the dynam-
ics of the “maritime vector” of Europe — a large well-developed region with 
long-standing tradition of benefiting from its coastal position. 
The European coastline is 70,000 kilometres long within the EU and is 
washed by the Atlantic and the Arctic Oceans, as well as four large seas — the 
Baltic, North, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. Approximately 10,000 km of the 
European coastline are controlled by Russia and Ukraine. The EU coastal region 
(within a 100 km range) was home to 52 % of the Union’s population and ac-
counted for 51 % of its GDP (PPP) in 2011. Overall, together with similar terri-
tories of non-EU European countries, the European costal region is home to 
4.5 % of the world’s population and a producer of 11.3 % of the world GDP. 
To a great degree, Europe owes its prosperity to the sea. Shipbuilding and 
navigation, fishing and fish processing, port industry, energy resource extrac-
tion (oil, gas, and renewable resources), coastal and marine tourism, and aqua-
culture are all key maritime activities. The pronounced “maritime” develop-
ment vector results in significant benefits associated with an increase in inter-
national trade, which makes Europe a leading economy. The potential of off-
shore areas and coasts requires constant development. The stability of the ma-
rine environment is a major prerequisite for the success and competitiveness of 
the above-mentioned industries. The implementation of industry-specific and 
national marine policies, for instance, in the fields of transport, fishery, energy, 
or tourism can lead to conflicts of interests and reduce their efficiency. There 
is a need for closer cooperation and integrated approach to solving problems. 
The current concept developed by the European Commission (Inte-
grated Maritime Policy for the European Union, 2007) focuses on the com-
prehensive maritime policy covering all aspects of relations between the so-
ciety and marine ecosystems. This innovative approach is expected to be 
highly efficient [19]. The attention of the European community to the issues 
of marine environment is rapidly increasing. At the same time, the tension in 
the nature/society system is growing, too. On the one hand, modern tech-
nologies make it possible to generate excess profits from the coastal and ma-
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rine areas, and attract investment and human resources to these territories. 
On the other hand, they contribute to a growing pressure on the environment. 
The need for a prompt response to this challenge is further intensified by 
rapid globalisation and climate change. 
Being aware of these circumstances, the EU, represented by the European 
Commission, launched the process of extensive consultations and analysis of 
the current situation. The Integrated Maritime Policy rests on the clear under-
standing of close connection between the existing problems and the need for a 
joint coordinated solution. Working programmes and initiatives within differ-
ent industries should be developed in the framework of the common policy. 
The following projects are considered crucial to the European Union: 
1) creating a European maritime transport space without barriers; 
2) developing a European strategy for marine and maritime research 
3) developing national integrated maritime policies; 
4) creating a European maritime surveillance network; 
5) developing a roadmap for maritime spatial planning; 
6) formulating a strategy for mitigating the impact of climate change in 
coastal areas; 
7) reducing environmental pollution, including CO2 emission, associated 
with navigation; 
8) eliminating pirate fishing and destructive high seas bottom trawling 
9) promoting a European network of maritime clusters; 
10) reviewing the EU labour law exemptions for the shipping and fish-
ing sectors [19]. 
This document sets a framework for cooperation and identifies key areas 
of EC activities in the field of managing and developing cross-industry tools 
for implementing the EU Integrated Maritime Policy. Practical steps are to be 
based on the principles of subsidiarity, increasing competitiveness, ecosystem 
approach, and active participation of stakeholders. These projects seem to be 
feasible. Certain complications are associated with the implementation of ini-
tiatives 6 (high cost of environment protection efforts) and 10 (a conflict be-
tween national and common European interests). Despite well-known tensions 
between Russia and the EU, the current agenda suggests further development 
of bilateral and multilateral (intergovernmental and interregional) cooperation 
in all priority areas for Russia: the Arctic, Baltic, and Baltic Sea regions. 
An example of EU international cooperation is its innovation policy in the 
framework of the programme for developing marine technology (“blue 
growth”) for 2014—20. In particular, it includes the creation of a digital map 
of European waters by 2020. The map should have a high resolution, reflect 
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the topography and geology of habitats and ecosystem, grant access to infor-
mation on the past and present physical, chemical, and biological condition of 
waters, contain data on human activities and their impact on marine ecosys-
tems required for oceanographic forecasts. The first steps have already been 
made. One of them is the publication of the European Atlas of the Seas [37]. 
According to the geosystem approach, the zoning of the World Ocean and 
coastal territories is a crucial method of summarising and analysing spatial in-
formation that forms the basis for managing different social, natural, and socio-
natural processes taking place in different conditions (environments) at different 
levels of the spatial hierarchy. The major problem is the principal difference be-
tween the marine and land geosystems. There is no unanimous opinion in the 
research community as to the principles of zoning marine and marine-land sys-
tems (see the works of S. Salnikov, S. Mikhailov, V. Dergachev, G. Gogoberi-
dze, etc.). However, industry-specific zoning schemes are the most common. 
This approach is widely used in Europe. In particular, the EU Maritime Policy 
uses different schemes for zoning the adjacent seas. The most recent variation 
was developed after 2007 and includes eight large marine regions, six of which 
lap the shores of the “mainland” EU (the Baltic, North, and Celtic Seas, the Bay 
of Biscay, the Iberian Coast, and the Mediterranean and Black Seas). The seas 
that surround distant territories of Spain, Portugal, and France (overseas depart-
ments) and the Arctic Ocean are considered separately [37]. 
This zoning scheme corresponds to the key areas of the EU Maritime 
Policy. However, the developing international cooperation, including that 
with non-member states, requires certain additions. Firstly, there is a promis-
ing “test field” between the Euroregion of the North Sea and Arctic Ocean 
with increasing participation of Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe 
Islands. This can be achieved through expanding the “responsibility areas” 
of the North Sea region northwards along the Norwegian coast and that of 
the Celtic Sea region towards Iceland and Greenland. Secondly, it is possible 
to divide the vast and diverse (in terms of natural and socioeconomic condi-
tions) Mediterranean region. Within the EU, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the Western and Central Mediterranean regions, as well as those of the 
Adriatic and Aegean Seas. It is also important to take into account the pro-
spective development of cooperation with the coastal countries of Eastern 
Europe (Russia, Ukraine), Turkey, and Georgia. 
This work aims to give an overview and study the dynamics of the eco-
nomic development of European coastal regions in the beginning of the 21st 
century. Therefore, the applied zoning scheme is “coast-centric” and focused 
primarily on the economic and geographical economic features of the local 
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business activities. At the same time, special attention is paid to the eco-
nomic use and features of the environment of contiguous offshore areas. The 
key zoning factors (groups of factors) are physical geographical, resource, 
and environmental ones, as well as those of transport position, economic 
specialisation, political and administrative organisation, and management. 
Based on a combination of natural and socioeconomic conditions, it is possi-
ble to distinguish between eight marine and coastal regions (see fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. European coastal regions. 
Economic development dynamics, 2000—2011 
 
For the purposes of an economic and statistical analysis, coastal territories in-
corporate a 100 km onshore area. All political and administrative units, more than 
half of whose population live within this area, are considered coastal. The analysis 
and calculation units are Eurostat’s NUTS 2 territories and Russia’s and Ukraine’s 
regions. The 100 km area suggests the convenient accessibility of the coast by car. 
Moreover, this approach makes it possible to cover almost all European regions 
with sea access except for Western Finland, West Midland (the UK), and Karelia 
(Russia), where most population lives at a distance of over 1000 km from the 
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coast (see fig. 1). The European Atlas of the Seas uses a 50 km criterion, which 
seems to be too strict for large regions of Eastern Europe [37]. 
Table 1 summarises data on the development of major marine sector industries 
of foreign European countries (excluding Ukraine; as per the methodology of the 
European Atlas of the Seas). These industries include coastal and marine tourism, 
aquaculture, mineral extraction, fishery, transport, shipbuilding, and ship repair. As 
of 2010, the number of those employed in these industries did not exceed 3.5 m 
people and its output 256 billion euros. The North Sea-Norwegian region boasted 
the best-developed marine sector with an output of 119 billion euros accounting 
for 47 % of the total output of all European coastal regions (the contribution of 
mineral resource extraction amounts to 75 billion euros); however, the Western 
Mediterranean one employs more people (659 and 965 thousand respectively). 
 
Table 1 
 
Population and development of marine sector industries  
in foreign European countries (2010) 
 
Region 
Population  
100 km area), m
 people (2011)**
Number of those employed 
in the key marine sector 
industries, 1,000 people 
Output of key  
marine sector  
industries, m euros 
Arctic 3.1 … … 
Baltic 38.1 355.9 17870 
North Sea-
Norwegian 62.5 659.4 119391 
British-North 
Atlantic 42.1 281.5 11065 
Biscayan-Iberian 40.2 409.4 14034 
Western 
Mediterranean 42.5 964.6 48152 
Central-
Mediterranean 44.6 609.6 43134 
Black Sea 29.3 251.3* 2442* 
Total 302.3 3531.7* 256088* 
 
* Excluding Ukraine. 
** Including Russia and Ukraine. 
Calculated by [38]. 
Tables 2 and 3 present detailed information on the employment rate and 
output of the marine sector industries of foreign European countries. The most 
labour-intensive industry is coastal and marine tourism, which accounts for 
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1.6 m or 47 % of all those employed in the marine sector. Partially owing to 
this industry, Europe remains the world leader in international tourism. The 
other largest employing industries are fishery (22 %) and transport (15 %). 
 
Table 2 
 
Employment in the industries of marine sector in foreign European countries  
 
Region 
Number of employees, thousand people 
Coastal and 
marine 
tourism 
Aquacul-
ture 
Mineral 
extraction
Fishery Transport
Shipbuilding 
and ship  
repair 
Baltic 123.5 0.7 2.9 107.6 61.0 60.2 
North Sea-
Norwegian 
251.0 12.7 60.2 117.5 151.0 67.0 
British-North 
Atlantic 
146.8 10.7 0.6 42.9 47.8 32.7 
Biscayan-
Iberian 
144.0 29.7 0.9 168.5 21.8 44.5 
Western 
Mediterranean 
472.3 40.2 2.3 226.2 127.2 96.4 
Central-
Mediterranean 
354.8 6.2 3.9 82.3 116.4 46.0 
Black Sea* 160.5 0.2 3.8 21.1 20.8 44.9 
Total 1652.9 100.4 74.6 766.1 546.0 391.7 
 
* Excluding Ukraine. 
Calculated by [38]. 
 
In terms of monetary value, the leading industry is mineral extraction 
(see table 3). It accounts for 30 % of the marine sector output. Primarily, it is 
hydrocarbon extraction. Transport still accounts for another 30 %. Coastal 
and marine tourism is ranked third with 21 %. Overall, the marine sector of 
foreign European countries accounts for 2 % of their GDP, and this percent-
age remains stable. According to earlier data [33], the total output of key ma-
rine sector industries was estimated at 2 % of the world’s national income in 
the beginning of the 1970s. At the time, the structure of the sector included 
oil and gas extraction and navigations, which accounted for 65—75 % of the 
total income [33]. 
Table 3 
 
Output of marine sector industries in foreign European countries  
